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3.1 The Association among Money, Prices,
and Nominal Interest Rates
In analyzing recent United States inflation it is natural—at least for
me—to begin with Milton Friedman's famous statement, "Inflation is
always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon."
1 This proposition
receives a lot of support from evidence across countries, over long
periods of time within a variety of individual countries, and from some
extreme inflationary experiences. As examples, one can note the rapid
inflations in several Latin American countries—all of which were accom-
panied by excessive monetary growth—the long-period association be-
tween money and prices in the United States under differing monetary
environments, and the parallel between monetary and price movements
during extreme hyperinflations, such as that in post-World War I Ger-
many. At present I want to focus on the accuracy of Friedman's proposi-
tion for the United States experience since World War II and, especially,
for developments in recent years. As will be seen, it is important particu-
larly at the present time to recognize that the phrase "monetary phe-
nomenon" refers not only to movements in the quantity of money but
also to factors that influence the public's willingness to hold money—that
is, the demand for money.
The association between inflation and growth of monetary aggregates
seems to be a close one over periods of more than a few years. For
example, for the 1948 to 1979 period in the United States, the average
inflation rate—as measured by changes in the deflator for the gross
national product, which is a broad index with desirable properties—was
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3.7% per year. The corresponding average growth rate of the Ml defini-
tion of the money stock, which comprises currency and checkable de-
posits, was 3.8% per year. The overall relation divides conveniently into
two subperiods. For the first interval, from 1948 to 1965, the average
inflation rate was 2.0% per year and the average monetary growth rate
was 2.3% per year. (These rates appear now to constitute little inflation
and money growth, although the amounts were sufficient at the time to
generate the experiment with wage-price guideposts in the 1960s.) For
the second subperiod, from 1965 to 1979, the average inflation rate was
5.7% per year and the average monetary growth rate was also 5.7% per
year. The advance in the average inflation rate from the first period to the
second was, in fact, paralleled by an increase in the average monetary
growth rate. However, this precise a linkage would not have appeared if
we had looked at year-to-year relations rather than the association over
several years.
The correspondence between the numbers for average inflation and
rate of monetary expansion over the two long subperiods is misleading in
any case, because it obscures two major phenomena whose effects on
inflation happened to be roughly offsetting. First, economic growth
would allow for some absorption of money without provoking inflation.
My estimate of the magnitude of this effect—the net result of an offset-
ting trend during the post-World War II period away from the real
demand for money as defined by Ml and toward the demand for other
assets—is that a growth rate of the money stock equal to about \Vi% per
year would be consistent with zero inflation. On this count the average
inflation rate over the 1948-79 period should have been 2.3% per year—
Wi% per year below the average rate of monetary expansion—rather
than the actual value of 3.7% per year.
An opposing, positive effect on prices arose since 1948 because the
increases in average rates of price change, which became anticipated,
were then reflected in higher nominal interest rates. That is, lenders
required this rise in interest rates to compensate for inflation and—
because they would be repaying with deflated dollars—borrowers were
correspondingly willing to pay the higher nominal rates. For present
purposes, the important effect is the inverse influence of these higher
interest rates on the public's willingness to hold non-interest-bearing
money. Like an increase in the supply of money for a given level of real
demand—as determined by real income and others factors—a reduction
in the demand for money generates a higher level of prices. That is, the
general price level must rise in order for individuals to be satisfied to hold
the existing stock of money rather than spend it on commodities or
interest-bearing assets.
Over the 1965-79 period, the interest rate on Aaa rated (long-term)
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effect of this change on the demand for money raised the average infla-
tion rate from 1965 to 1979 by almost 2% per year. It is often said that
these types of shifts in the demand for money—also referred to as
increases in the velocity or frequency of monetary circulation—represent
one-time influences on the level of prices rather than continuing in-
fluences that appear as a higher average rate of inflation. However, the
"one-time" price level effect was sufficient in this case to contribute a
substantial amount to the average inflation rate over the years 1965-79.
Over the entire 1948 to 1979 period, the interest rate on Aaa corporate
bonds advanced from 2.8% to 9.6%, which I estimate pushed up the
average rate of inflation over the full thirty-one years by about 1.1% per
year—still a substantial effect on average inflation from the channel of
higher velocity.
The mechanism by which higher expected inflation is embedded in
higher nominal interest rates, which reduce the demand for money and
thereby push up the price level, is significant in interpreting some longer-
term aspects of the inflationary experience over the years 1948-79, but it
is far more important in accounting for the lack of a close year-to-year
association between changes in money and changes in prices. Up to 1965,
the year-to-year movements in long-term interest rates were relatively
small: the largest one-year changes were the increases by about one-half a
percentage point for 1957 and 1959. Therefore, although the shifts in
demand for money that were provoked by interest rate changes or other
factors could have weakened the year-to-year correlation between infla-
tion and monetary growth substantially, the channel of shifting interest
rates did not generate the volatility of prices that has recently become
familiar.
The moderate fluctuations in long-term interest rates before 1965 can,
in turn, be related to the relative stability of long-term inflationary
expectations. These anticipations would be justified under our earlier
type of monetary system, which provided some constraints on the long-
run expansion of monetary aggregates. I will return to this theme shortly.
The behavior of long-term interest rates has been far more volatile
since 1965: year-to-year movements by one-half a percentage point or
more have become typical, and increases in the neighborhood of one full
percentage point occurred in 1969, 1970, 1974, and 1979. For 1980 the
rise in long-term rates was on the order of two percentage points. (In-
cidentally, the largest negative change was -0.6 percentage points in
1971.) Quantitatively, I estimate that each one percentage point move in
these interest rates is associated positively—through the channel of
higher velocity that was described above—with about a four percentage
point shift in the one-year inflation rate. Therefore the recent volatility of
interest rates, induced by volatility of inflationary expectations, corre-
sponds to magnified fluctuations in short-run inflation rates.102 Robert J. Barro
There are some unsettled issues concerning the timing among interest
rate shifts, velocity changes, and price level movements. In the case of
money supply shocks (though apparently not for fully perceived changes
in money), there appear to be positive output effects in the United States
out to a lag of one to two years. The full positive response of the general
price level to a monetary surprise seems to take as long as four years. On
the other hand, the velocity shifts that are associated with interest rate
changes have no noticeable counterpart in the form of positive output
movements. (There is an indication of a minor negative effect.) A full
positive response of the price level within one year is consistent with
preliminary econometric evidence, although some lagged effect for an
additional year cannot be decisively ruled out. While the detailed findings
are tentative and subject to some estimation problems, they suggest that
the common practice of lumping money supply shocks and velocity shifts
together as disturbances to "nominal aggregate demand" may be seri-
ously misleading. Unlike for the case of monetary shocks, shifts in
inflationary expectations—which are reflected in interest rate movements
and in consequent changes in velocity—seem capable of producing
dramatic movements in the general price level within a one-year period.
The interplay between inflationary expectations, interest rates, and
current actual inflation applies as much in the negative direction as it does
in the positive one that has been prevalent in recent years. Long-term
interest rates declined precipitously from around 13% in March 1980 to
about 11% in July. If interest rates had stayed at this reduced level for the
remainder of 1980, my estimate for overall 1980 inflation (based on the
deflator for the gross national product) would have been about 12%
rather than the roughly 18% value that would have been associated with
the March level of interest rates. (The actual rate of inflation for the GNP
deflator for 1980 was 9.3%.)
The sensitivity of short-run price level movements to shifts in inflation-
ary expectations has implications for the forecastability of inflation.
Suppose that movements in long-term bond yields are unpredictable,
which holds as a close approximation because participants in the efficient
security markets would react strongly to perceived future changes in bond
prices. In this case the volatility of bond yields—which currently seems
understated at plus or minus one percentage point per year—combined
with a fourfold association between long-term interest rate movements
and price level changes over a year suggests a minimal forecast error for
one-year-ahead inflation rates of plus or minus 4% per year. (This
conclusion obtains if no other price-determining variables are strongly
correlated with long-term interest rate movements). For the present
economic environment, this analysis indicates that no econometric model
could ever reduce the average error in one-year-ahead inflation rate
predictions below this amount.
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influences rather than on numerous special factors that primarily in-
fluence relative prices. The general price level is not found by simple
addition of the relative prices for food, oil, medical care, housing, and so
on. In fact, any absolute level of prices and any overall rate of inflation
are consistent with any specified configuration of levels or changes in
relative prices. This observation leaves open the possibility that a particu-
lar allocative disturbance could raise the general price level and simul-
taneously increase some specified relative prices. For example, a harvest
failure in the United States, which raises the relative price of food, also
has some downward impact on United States aggregate output and
thereby a positive effect on the absolute price level for a given behavior of
the money stock. Similarly, a rise in the relative costs of (imported) oil
tends to depress United States real income and thereby raise the overall
level of prices. Any positive monetary response to this type of disturb-
ance would reinforce the inflationary impact, although the limited evi-
dence on money supply behavior does not support this hypothesis. In any
event these possibilities for short-term interplays between inflation and
relative price changes should not obscure the point that the principal
movements in United States inflation cannot be explained along these
lines.
3.2 The Role of a Monetary Standard
A key issue is the reason for the changes in the behavior of interest
rates and the relation of these changes to developments in the monetary
process. My conjectured scenario is as follows. In earlier periods before
roughly 1965, the monetary regime guaranteed some long-run stability in
monetary growth and therefore in long-term inflation, which in turn
restricted the effects of shifting inflationary expectations on movements
of long-term interest rates. Elements of the monetary regime that worked
in this direction were fixed exchange rates and some remnants of the
classical gold standard, as reflected in the maintenance of a fixed value for
the dollar price of gold (although gold was subject at most times to some
exchange restrictions). The pegging of some nominal prices—that is, the
willingness of the central bank to buy or sell a specific commodity for a
fixed number of dollars—and the related balance-of-payments mechan-
ism—whereby a country that inflated unduly lost international reserves
such as gold or some paper alternatives that became popular in the
post-World War II period—provided at least some restraint on long-run
world monetary expansion. The international economy has been moving
gradually away from this type of monetary setup since World War I and
especially since the 1930s, although some remnants of the gold standard
and fixed exchange rates in the form of the post-World War II Bretton
Woods arrangements were in operation as recently as 1971.
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adhere to a gold or silver standard, these episodes typically occurred in
times of war and could reasonably be perceived as temporary. For
example, the United States was on a system of flexible exchange rates
following the Civil War until the resumption of the gold standard in 1879.
In fact, the drop by about 50% in the price level from 1866 to 1879 can be
viewed as a prerequisite for returning to the prewar gold price. It seems
reasonable to view this period as substantially influenced by the prospects
for eventual return to the gold standard at the earlier parity. The period
since 1971 seems to be the first time that we have completely severed,
both currently and prospectively, the link between our money and a
commodity base. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this policy move
was its casual nature—after all, most people thought that the important
economic action in 1971 was the institution of the Nixon price controls.
An earlier manifestation of the trend away from a commodity standard
was the removal of silver from most United States coins minted after
1964. I have often (only partly in jest) referred to this action as one of
President Johnson's most significant policy moves. The Johnson decision
on silver and Nixon's 1971 attempt to demonetize gold were typically
viewed at the time as aspects of the modern trend away from the special
monetary role of the precious metals. But they seem more appropriately
regarded as a continuation of the well-established tendency of all unre-
strained monarchs to secure revenue by debasing the currency. In fact, a
principal point of the gold standard was to control governments, and we
have not become sufficiently modern to come up with a statisfactory
substitute (although governments have perhaps become more adept at
eliminating these constraints).
There were some good economic reasons for shifting to a flexible
exchange rate system. Under the Bretton Woods regime where exchange
rates were pegged within relatively narrow bounds, individual countries
often resorted to restrictions on trade in commodities and capital in order
to prevent balance-of-payments deficits, which would have led naturally
to lower rates of domestic monetary growth and inflation. These trade
restrictions tended in general to retard economic efficiency. Further, with
countries unwilling to tie domestic monetary policies fully to the dictates
of the fixed exchange rate/gold standard setup, there were recurring
financial crises that led occasionally to large devaluations (or, less fre-
quently, to upward adjustments in the form of revaluations) of individual
currencies. (Of course, this process had the indirect benefit of providing
high levels of employment for central bankers and financial crisis man-
agers more generally. But presumably, these people have experienced no
trouble finding work in the present, calm financial climate.) There were
some real benefits along the above lines from switching to flexible ex-
change rates, although the tendency toward adopting trade restrictions
seems to be again on the rise.105 United States Inflation and the Choice of Monetary Standard
What is certainly clear is that before 1971 most economists underesti-
mated the extent to which the international system of fixed exchange
rates with some role for gold served, although imperfectly, to restrain
growth in the world money supply and thereby the world price level.
Since the move in 1971 toward flexible exchange rates and the complete
divorce of United States monetary management from the objective of a
pegged gold price, it is clear that the nominal anchor for the monetary
system—weak as it was earlier—is now entirely absent. Future monetary
growth and long-run inflation appear now to depend entirely on the
year-to-year "discretion" of the monetary authority, that is, the Federal
Reserve. Not surprisingly, inflationary expectations and their reflection
in nominal interest rates and hence in short-run inflation rates have all
become more volatile.
The current high long-term nominal interest rates seem principally to
represent the financial markets' prediction of an increase in future mone-
tary growth and long-term inflation, a possibility that arises because of
the shift to a paper money regime that possesses no nominal anchor.
Further, the expectation of future monetary expansion and inflation is
sufficient, as discussed earlier, to account for a leap in the short-run
actual rate of inflation without a contemporaneous acceleration of
monetary aggregates. However, it remains true even under our present
monetary arrangements (one cannot really call it a monetary "standard")
that the realization of higher long-term inflation is contingent on faster
growth of the actual money supply. This magnitude of acceleration of
money cannot, in fact, be discerned from the observed monetary data.
Following average annual rates of monetary growth of 7-8% for 1977-79
(for the new Ml-B concept of money, which includes NOW accounts and
similar types of interest-bearing, checkable deposits), there was a sharp
deceleration of money from February through May 1980. This monetary
contraction was apparently reversed for June-July: my estimate was that
money growth for all of 1980 would be at roughly a 5-6% rate. Even a
return to the previous monetary growth rate of 8% per year would lead in
the long run to annual inflation rates of only about 6-7%, which are well
below both the actual inflation rate for 1980 and the forecasts of future
average inflation that were implicit in nominal interest rates during 1980.
The inflation predictions that were implicit in security market yields for
1980 were on the order of 10-11% for a long-term average. These
projections corresponded, in turn, to forecasted long-run monetary
growth of about 12% per year, as contrasted with the actual values for
1980 of less than 8% (which itself represented an acceleration from the
2% rate that prevailed earlier in the post-World War II period). I surely
do not claim to have inflation and monetary growth predictions that are
superior to those revealed by the financial markets; after all, much more
than me, their livelihood depends on making reasonable forecasts.106 Robert J. Barro
3.3 Possibilities for Monetary Reform
If the above scenario is correct, the inflation problem must be analyzed
in terms of changes to the basic monetary structure. It would make a
major difference if institutional changes were made that once again
provided a nominal anchor for the monetary system. The important
constrast is between mechanisms that precommit the long-run path of
nominal aggregates and those, like the present procedure, which allow
nominal values to evolve in the long run as the accumulation of short-run
monetary decisions that are subject at each date to policymaker "discre-
tion." A system that ensures long-run price stability would also sharply
dampen the volatility of interest rates, which are a major factor in the
variability of short-term inflation rates.
3.4 Commodity Standards
As mentioned before, our previous systems with nominal anchors have
involved fixed exchange rates with some role for a pegged price of a
reserve commodity such as gold. One possibility would be to return to
this type of system, possibly with an expanded commodity base substitut-
ing for the special position of gold or silver. Some detailed proposals of
this type were advanced many years ago under the title of commodity-
reserve currency. The history of this idea goes back almost a hundred
years to Alfred Marshall's proposal for using gold and silver together in
the form of a stable bimetallism, which is usually called "symmetallism."
The basic idea is for the central bank to vary the money supply and its
corresponding commodity reserve as dictated by pegging the price of a
reserve bundle that includes so many ounces of gold, so many ounces of
silver, a few bricks, a certain amount of wheat, and so on. That is, the
central bank would stand ready to buy or sell units of this reserve bundle
at a fixed dollar price. It has been argued that considerations of storability
and homogeneity severely limit the feasible scope for this type of com-
modity reserve.
One general drawback of this type of setup is the resource cost for
maintaining the commodity base, which seems now to be a trivial price if
it would actually buy a satisfactory remedy for inflation. The biggest
problem may be that the "saving" in these resource costs typically takes
the form of additions to government revenue via direct or indirect de-
basement of the currency. Another problem with commodity standards
involves fluctuations in the pegged price of the reserve bundle relative to
prices in general—which are the ultimate objects of interest. This prob-
lem is likely to arise when the commodity reserve is not representative of
consumer market baskets, as seems surely to be the case. In this context it
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prices of gold and silver would have arisen if the international economy
had remained on the gold standard.
It is in any case clear from history that even a reasonably serious gold
standard—such as that operating in the pre-World War I period—may
have ruled out chronic inflation, but did not prevent sharp short-run
changes in domestic monetary aggregates, which were associated under
our fractional-reserve banking system with financial panics and economic
contractions. For example, the sharp downturn from 1893 to 1897—
which seems second in severity over the last century only to the Great
Depression of the 1930s—occurred during the peak operation of the gold
standard. Of course, the elimination of fractional-reserve banking may
have prevented these problems.
3.5 A Monetary Constitution
More realistic possibilities seem to involve the establishment of some
type of monetary constitution,
2 which would involve precise legal restric-
tions (hence, precommitments) on the long-term path of nominal aggre-
gates. The well-known constant-growth-rate rule for the money supply,
long advocated by Milton Friedman, is a monetary system of this general
type. The important aspect of Friedman's proposal is neither the con-
stancy of the growth rate nor the choice of a particular number for the
rate nor the precise definition of the monetary aggregate, but rather the
firm commitment to and hence anchor on some future nominal values.
This type of system would also avoid a number of difficulties and costs
that characterize commodity standards. However, while this type of
monetary constitution seems attractive in theory, it should be empha-
sized that our historical experience provides evidence only about the
workings of regimes with nominal anchors that are of the gold standard
type, not about environments where the behavior of paper money is
backed by explicit legal commitments. Clearly, the form of these commit-
ments is an important matter that warrants extensive discussion. Notably,
the law or constitutional provision would have to be written so as to
provide proper inducements to ensure that government officials behaved
in accordance with the rules. I certainly do not wish to exaggerate the
probability of achieving satisfactory governmental compliance.
Although the most important consideration is the capacity of a mone-
tary constitution to peg some future nominal values, there is also some
significance to the choice of concept for the target monetary aggregate.
This decision is analogous to the selection of a specific reserve bundle
under a commodity-reserve-currency scheme. Stabilization of the monet-
ary base—currency plus bank reserves held at the Federal Reserve—has
the advantage of applying to a magnitude that is under reasonably close
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experiences, most notably the Great Depression, indicate that control of
the base does not guarantee stability of broader monetary aggregates or
the general price level. From 1929 to 1933 the monetary base advanced at
an average annual rate of 3.4% at the same time that Ml declined at an
average rate of 7.3% and the price level fell by an average of 6.3% per
year. Similar, but less dramatic, behavior for the monetary aggregates
applies to the 1937 recession. The Great Depression experience involved
sharp increases in the public's demand for currency and in banks' demand
for reserves, both of which were spurred by widespread bank failures.
The 1937 recession involved a startling rise in required reserves by the
Fed. Conceivably, these large variations in the relation of the money
supply to the monetary base could no longer occur; in particular, the
institution of federal deposit insurance seems to have eliminated bank
failures as a major element in money supply determination. However,
particularly with the Federal Reserve's moves in the spring of 1980 to
extend reserve requirements to a variety of institutions, one cannot
confidently rule out the type of dramatic shift in required reserves that
occurred in 1937.
At the other end of the spectrum, one could instruct the Fed to stabilize
the general price level. However, because this proposal applies to a
variable that is only indirectly influenced by Fed instruments, it would
invite volatility in the monetary aggregates. A compromise between
stabilization of the monetary base and stabilization of the price level
would be a rule expressed in terms of the most familiar monetary aggre-
gate, Ml, which includes currency and checkable deposits—that is,
media of exchange. Empirical evidence indicates that, first, this aggre-
gate can be reasonably well controlled by the Fed at least on a quarter-to-
quarter basis and, second, stabilization of this concept of money goes a
long way toward ensuring stability of overall economic activity.
Another issue that arises is whether, say, quarterly errors in achieving
money growth targets should be compensated or forgotten in subsequent
quarters. For example, suppose that the monetary rule dictates expan-
sions in seasonally adjusted Ml-B at a 2% annual rate. If the actual
growth for one quarter is excessive by an annual rate of 1%, should the
next quarter's target be 2% or 1% (or some value in between)? In a
regime where past mistakes are ignored in formulating future growth rate
targets, the level of nominal aggregates (and the price level) at future
dates involves the summation of all these random errors. The levels of
money and prices therefore become increasingly unpredictable as the
horizon increases. Further, a system where mistakes are forgotten seems
less likely to be well enforced. Therefore there are some arguments for
requiring monetary errors to be made up in future periods. The precise
timing of this adjustment seems unimportant, although a full correction
for the subsequent quarter is one possibility.109 United States Inflation and the Choice of Monetary Standard
3.6 Wage and Price Controls
The discussion of monetary structures that anchor expectations about
future dollar values should be contrasted with a different approach that
also frequently stresses expectations, namely, wage and price controls.
The systems I have analyzed constrain fluctuations in expectations about
future prices by providing substantive constraints on the future monetary
magnitudes that ultimately determine inflation. In this way the limited
fluctuations of inflationary expectations feed back into stability of current
values of interest rates and prices. However, a key element in this
analysis is the reasonableness or rationality of the stable expectations that
emerge. The mechanism is internally consistent in the sense that indi-
viduals have an objective basis for their beliefs and do not observe
patterns for money and prices that deviate dramatically and persistently
from their expectations.
Arguments for wage and price controls often stress the important effect
of shifting inflationary expectations on current prices and interest rates.
However, these proposals neglect the rationality of these expectations in
the sense of their consistency with the underlying institutional setup that
determines monetary behavior. Expectations cannot be stabilized with-
out stabilizing the variables—in this case long-run money growth and
inflation—to which the expectations pertain. The recurring failure of
controls reflects their focus on symptoms rather than on the underlying
sources of inflation.
3.7 The Nature of Policy Advice
I conclude by commenting on a type of policy advice that seems not so
useful for economists to offer. Namely, there is a tendency—in which I
certainly have shared—to recommend year-by-year values for money
growth, deficits, and so on, without questioning the underlying policy
structure. Telling the Federal Reserve to select substantially different
values—usually lower values—for monetary growth seems similar to
urging firms and households to choose different numbers for prices,
employment, production, and so on. As in the case of the private sector,
it is reasonable to view the Fed's monetary decisions as emerging from a
given structure of constraints and rewards, although possibly the nature
of this process is less well understood for the case of the monetary
authority than it is for businesses and consumers. In particular, I doubt
whether it makes much difference whether the Federal Reserve Board
chairman's name is Volcker or Miller or Burns or even—almost beyond
imagination—Milton Friedman. Recommendations for changed mone-
tary behavior would be most usefully expressed in terms of proposed
alterations to the underlying constraint and reward structure. The adop-110 Robert J. Barro
tion of a monetary constitution or reinstatement of a gold standard type
of regime represents this type of change in the structure of policy.
Discussions of the inflation problem would be usefully phrased in terms
of the desirable or undesirable operating characteristics of alternative
monetary regimes, which include the gold standard and other possi-
bilities.
Notes
1. Milton Friedman, "Inflation: Causes and Consequences," Council for Economic
Education (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1963), reprinted in Dollars and Deficits
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), p. 39.
2. Another possibility, which I have not given attention to in this paper, involves
removing the government from the money-issue business. Media of exchange would then be
provided entirely by private entities. The workings of a private, noncommodity monetary
system are not well understood (at least by me).